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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Much of the recent attention to Islamic law has been motivated by the recent 
public discourse concerning Islam, mosques, and anti-Sharia sentiment in America 
and abroad. The Center for American Progress recently published a report called 
Fear Inc.: The Root of the Islamophobia Network in America.1 It is a very extensive 
report and is meticulously researched. Among its important findings is the fact that 
seven private foundations have contributed nearly $43 million between 2001 and 
2009 to various Islamophobic think tanks.2 So the discourse regarding Islam in the 
United States is not an accident, and it is not part of a grassroots movement. I suggest 
it is part of a very well-organized campaign with very precise political goals.
 This essay will give a much more academic presentation on the general question 
of how Islamic law fits within the framework of secular legal systems, focusing 
specifically on the relationship between Islamic law and non-Islamic law. In Part II, 
I discuss Islamic law as part of global law. In Part III, I address the distinction 
between Islamic law as a system of morality and as a system of positive law. In Part 
IV, I outline the use of treaties in non-Muslim majority countries. In Part V, I discuss 
Islam’s models of co-existence and modern-day democratic equality. Part VI looks at 
the potential conflicts between principles of Islam and those of citizenship. Part VII 
highlights the differences between historical Islamic law and modern Muslim beliefs, 
and, finally, in Part VIII, I examine some recent trends in U.S. foreign policy and 
Muslim transnationalism.
ii. isLaMiC Law as part Of gLObaL Law
 I want to start off with an overview and with the idea of Islamic law as a part of 
global law and other legal systems. I did not do a formal survey to determine exactly 
how many jurisdictions formally apply substantive Islamic law as part of their 
national legal systems; however, I think we probably can take for granted that many 
Muslim-majority countries apply some substantive Islamic law as part of their secular 
legal systems.3 But what might be a little surprising is that scores of non-Muslim 
majority countries also apply substantive Islamic law as part of their domestic legal 
systems. One example is India, where substantive Islamic law is a part of the Indian 
legal system. A second example would be Israel. In Israel, Islamic law forms a part of 
the Israeli legal system. In Greece, there is a community of Muslims who are 
governed by Islamic law in certain matters pursuant to a treaty between Turkey and 
Greece that was entered into shortly after World War I. Kenya is another example. 
So there are scores of non-Muslim majority countries that already use Islamic law 
and recognize Islamic law as part of their ordinary legal systems, which are coercively 
1. Wajaht Ali et al., Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America (2011), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf.
2. See id. at 3.
3. See generally Chibli Mallat, On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38 Case W. Res. J. 
Int’l L. 13 (2006) (discussing the application of substantive Islamic law in Middle Eastern, Muslim-
majority countries such as Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).
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enforced by the state. Thus, it is not only in Muslim countries that Islamic law is 
enforceable law. 
 I point this out because Islamic law as a global legal phenomenon exists all over 
the world, and therefore, it is hard to imagine that Islamic law somehow has not 
come up with some kind of systematic, principled method of integrating itself into 
the different legal and political circumstances facing Muslims throughout the world. 
Muslims are a fifth of the world’s population. They live in almost every country of 
the world. This essay will discuss how Islamic law fits in with non-Islamic legal 
systems—that is, what are the principles governing this intersection? What are the 
sources of tension and what are the sources of reconciliation?
iii. isLaMiC Law as a sYstEM Of MOraLitY and as a sYstEM Of pOsitiVE Law
 First, I want to begin by elaborating on an important ambiguity that arises when 
we talk about Islamic law, one which I think is necessary to keep in mind. Often 
times we conflate Islamic law as a system of moral reasoning on the one hand with 
Islamic law as a system of positive law on the other, when in fact these are two 
completely separate systems. It is very important to always keep these two meanings 
distinct in our minds.
 A. Ahkaam al-Taklif: The Rules of Obligation
 When discussing Islamic law as a system of moral reasoning, the jurists talk 
about something called Ahkaam al-Taklif, the Rules of Obligation. These rules state 
that every human act or omission can fall into one of five moral categories. The first 
category is wajib, which means obligatory. According to these Rules, there are certain 
acts that God has made obligatory on human beings. There are also certain acts or 
omissions that God has prohibited to human beings, which are called haram. A third 
category includes certain acts that God has encouraged, but humans incur no sin if 
we fail to perform them—this category is called “recommended.” In contrast to the 
“recommended” acts, there are also certain acts which would be better if we did not 
do them, but we incur no blame if we do. These acts are called “disfavoured.” Finally, 
there is a residual category called “the indifferent acts,” for which we incur neither 
blame nor approbation. An interesting aspect of these rules is that, despite Islamic 
law’s reputation for being totalitarian, the default category for all human conduct is 
this last category, “the indifferent.” So Muslim jurisprudence starts with the 
assumption that anything a human being can do is morally indifferent in the eyes of 
God. If somebody wants to claim that something is otherwise, then the burden is on 
that person to produce some sort of evidence of an obligation. This is a very important 
structural feature of Muslim moral reasoning—the default status of freedom. 
Accordingly, under the rules of obligation, we assume we are free to act in the 
absence of some sort of express evidence compelling us to act or compelling us to 
refrain from acting.
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 B. Ahkaam al-Wad’: The Positive Rules
 In contrast to this system of moral reasoning within Islamic law is the positive 
system of Islamic law, which the jurists call Ahkaam al-Wad’—the positive rules. 
These rules are very different from the rules of obligation; positive rules do not 
direct us to act in a certain way. Instead, they provide legal judgments as to the 
consequences of actions that we take. For example, a contract might be valid or 
invalid, or it might be void. These are examples of what the jurists call Ahkaam 
al-Wad’. It has nothing to do with our morality. For instance, if I entered into a 
contract with Professor Sadiq Reza, but we made a mistake causing the contract to 
be void, that does not mean that we have done anything wrong; we just do not have 
a legally binding contract. So whereas Islamic law as a system of moral reasoning 
deals with things like sin, reward, and virtue, the positive rules, the Akhaam al-Wad’, 
do not adopt this moralistic language at all. Instead, these rules take an objective 
view of the legal consequences. Other examples of these positive rules are binding or 
non-binding promises. For example, is a promise that I make legally binding? Or is 
it simply a promise that I can choose to fulfill or not fulfill, without legal consequence, 
at least in this life? I might ultimately answer to God, but I might not answer to the 
courts if we decide that promises are not legally binding.
 Another important source of positive law is jurisdictional rules, which are critical 
in understanding how Islamic law fits into non-Islamic legal systems. Islamic law has 
a very complex body of jurisdictional rules, which stems from the idea that Islamic 
law is not universal law. It is not a system of natural law that claims to bind every 
single human being, simply by virtue of being true. Of course, Islamic law believes 
that it is true, but that is not the point. The point is that its truth is not sufficient to 
bind those who do not recognize it as true.
 C. Jurist’s Law v. State Law
 Because Muslims believe Islam to be true, they are always morally bound to the 
rules of Islamic law, however, that is not the case for non-Muslims. Therefore Islamic 
law is always very careful to look at questions of jurisdiction to determine the extent to 
which these positive rules of Islamic law apply to any particular case. The other 
important point about Islamic law as it works within a legal system is what I call the 
distinction between jurist’s law and state law. I highly discourage the use of terms like 
“religious law” and “secular law.” This is because anyone with a little familiarity with 
Islamic law who begins reading the chapters of a legal treatise on sales, leases, or 
partnerships will have a very hard time understanding why this is religious law. In fact, 
the jurists do not consider Islamic law to be religious law. One of the reasons they do 
not consider it to be religious law is that anyone in an Islamic state, Muslim or non-
Muslim, is bound by these rules. So the rules of contract, property, and tort under 
Islamic law, for example, are considered universal rules that do not depend on religion.
 But Islamic law is a form of judge-made or jurist-made law. Why? Because the 
jurists developed it through their own system of reasoning. Therefore it seems that 
calling it the fiqh—calling it jurist law as opposed to religious law—is a much more 
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accurate conception of what it is. This is then contrasted not with secular law but 
with state law because Islamic law does not recognize only the rules that the jurists 
made. It also recognizes as binding and valid the rules that political decisionmakers 
make. Whenever one talks about Islamic law, we should keep in mind this distinction 
between juristic law and political law or state law. Accordingly, applied Islamic law is 
always a combination of the law of jurists and a law made by the political institutions 
of a state.
 Moreover, the laws articulated by a state are generally valid under the principles 
laid out by the jurists so long as two conditions are met. The first is that the rule that 
is being promulgated is consistent with the public good and it does not command 
disobedience to God. For example, Ramadan is a month in which Muslims fast. In 
the 1960s there was a notorious incident when the president of Tunisia at the time, 
Al-Habib Bourguiba, came on television drinking a glass of orange juice. He was 
saying that because our jihad, or struggle, today is production, he wanted to discourage 
observance of Ramadan on the grounds that it lowered economic productivity. One 
can imagine a particularly zealous ruler prohibiting certain religious observations on 
the ground that they are inconsistent with economic efficiency. From the perspective 
of Islamic law, this would be an illegitimate rule because it commands people to 
disobey God by prohibiting them from fulfilling their religious obligations. In general, 
there is not a rule against positive or man-made law in Islamic law, but there are 
restrictions on it—for example, all man-made laws have to be for the public good and 
cannot command sin.
 Finally, what is the state? How did medieval jurists understand the state? Did 
they understand the state as some kind of divine representative of God or as having 
some kind of charismatic authority from which the state derived its legitimacy? The 
answer is no, at least for the Sunnis who are about ninety percent of the Muslim 
world, the state is simply considered the agent of the community. The ruler is not 
considered some kind of divine figure, and the state is not considered some sort of 
embodiment of the divine will; the state is considered to be a public agent acting on 
behalf of the Muslim community, and that is the source from which the powers of 
government are derived. Hence, there is a contract of governance that establishes the 
state, which is why even if there is only one qualified candidate in the world for any 
office, he cannot be appointed, except pursuant to a valid contract. Therefore, there 
is never an issue of government by charismatic authority; rather, it is by the choice of 
the community, and the ruler is always treated as an agent of the community.
iV.  rEgULating MUsLiMs in nOn-MUsLiM MaJOritY COUntriEs: thE trEatY 
MOdEL
 Muslims have lived as minorities outside of an Islamic state since the day Islam 
came to this Earth. It is not a new phenomenon. In the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, Islam started as a minority—a minority of one, with him. It grew 
gradually, and early Muslims were subject to fierce persecution in Mecca. A substantial 
number of the early community members emigrated to Ethiopia or Abyssinia. 
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Eventually, the Muslims were forced to abandon Mecca entirely because of persecution. 
They fled to Medina, then known as Yathrib, where the Prophet established a state. 
Before the state was established, there was a written charter, or constitution. But once 
there was a state, there was a political entity for the Muslim community. That Muslim 
community, however, did not encompass all Muslims, even at that time. There were 
additional Muslims living in Abyssinia and, more importantly, there were also 
Muslims living in other parts of the Arabian Peninsula who did not emigrate to the 
new state. The Quran recognized differences between these groups. Several verses of 
the Quran expressly set forth rules that applied to Muslims who lived inside the 
Muslim state and others that applied to those who lived under a non-Muslim political 
community. Therefore even the Quran itself has consciousness of these jurisdictional 
issues that place limits on the applicability of Islamic law. Muslim jurists used these 
subtle distinctions in the Quran and in the history of the early community to develop 
a normative framework for regulating the presence of Muslims living outside of an 
Islamic state. The basic model was that of a treaty.
 The assumption was that Muslims who lived in a non-Muslim state lived there 
pursuant to a kind of treaty. Today these treaties in a modernized form might be 
considered a social contract, or a constitution. This was a normatively powerful idea 
because in Islamic law the obligation to maintain treaty commitments or maintain 
promises is considered a sacred obligation. Awfu bil uqud, a maxim of Islam, means 
“be faithful to your commitments.” Therefore, Islamic law made this a fundamental 
pillar of its international relations, requiring Muslims to be extremely careful not to 
breach their commitments to non-Muslims. There is a principle developed in 
international relations for treaty interpretation called al-hirz an al-ghadr, which 
means that we should interpret treaties in a way that prevents us from being accused 
of violating them. In other words, we should read them charitably, in favor of the 
other party, so the other side can never think that we are breaking the treaty.
 It is the treaty, then, that supplies the governing law between the Muslims and 
the non-Muslims, not Islamic law. As explained above, Islamic law does not claim 
universal applicability to non-Muslims. This is because non-Muslims by definition 
do not believe in Islam; therefore they do not have the same moral motivations to 
obey the laws that Muslims have. Hence, there has to be some other way for Muslims 
and non-Muslims to cooperate. The answer that Islamic jurists reached was this idea 
of a treaty that would bind both of them together and govern the terms of their 
relationship. There is an early report in which the Prophet was said to have told one 
of his companions that, when entering into an agreement with non-Muslims, the 
agreement should not be conditional on applying the law of God; rather, the Muslim 
party should say, “We (the parties) will apply our law (meaning the agreement)” 
because Muslims wanted to avoid the sin of violating God’s law should the other 
party breach the agreement. So there is a kind of theological motivation to these 
undertakings. It is better to make agreements in your own name so that if it turns 
out that you made a mistake, it can be corrected—rather than introducing God into 
the situation, with different understandings of the significance of what that means. 
The basic model of Muslim/non-Muslim cooperation is this contract, but are there 
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limitations on this contract? Can Muslims enter into any kind of contract with non-
Muslims? If one keeps in mind the moral aspect of Islamic law, the answer should be 
an obvious “no.” In an Islamic state, there are certain moral limitations on what the 
state can do. Likewise, a Muslim, whether an individual or a community, has moral 
limitations on the kinds of agreements it can enter into with non-Muslims. Here, the 
jurists talk about two primary limitations.
 The first is that the agreement cannot be humiliating because Muslims cannot 
agree to humiliate themselves. The idea is that once someone believes in God and 
knows his proper position in the universe, he becomes dignified, after which he 
cannot voluntarily agree to humiliate himself. This is called iltizam al-dhull. 
Therefore, Muslims are prohibited from undertaking any kind of act that would 
amount to humiliation. Of course, if one is forced into something, that is a different 
question, but then it is not a question of morality, it is a question of duress.
 The precedent for this is quite interesting. In the earliest days of the prophetic 
mission in Medina, the pagans of Arabia raised the greatest army that the Arabians 
had ever seen at that point, some 10,000 people. They laid siege to Medina, the city 
in which the Prophet had set up his state and an agricultural oasis. It was clear that 
the stakes were quite high: had the pagans won, that would have been the end of the 
Muslim community—they would have all been massacred. The Muslim community 
was quite small—they might have had 1000 people with arms. The Prophet wanted 
to break up this coalition through some sort of diplomacy. He negotiated with one of 
the parties to this coalition and asked them, “What do you think if we give you half 
of the produce of Medina in exchange for you going back to your country?” So the 
Bedouin chieftain at the time accepted the offer. Then the Prophet took that deal to 
the people of Medina and said, “What do you think? They’re willing to go away if we 
give them half of the crops of Medina for this year.” And so the leaders for the people 
of Medina said, “By God, no. Prior to Islam they would’ve never dared to take 
anything from us without payment. Now that we have Islam, we refuse to give them 
anything except through our free will.” Because they refused to accept what they 
considered to be terms of humiliation, the Prophet had to rescind the offer. The jurists 
took from this the idea that you cannot voluntarily accept humiliation in a treaty.
 The second argument, or limitation, is that the treaty cannot stipulate a sin. Just 
like a rule of positive law domestically, so too the treaty itself cannot stipulate the 
commission of a sin. Short of those two limitations, once a treaty is entered into, it 
becomes morally binding on Muslims to the same extent that a verse in the Quran is 
binding on them because of the moral rule that you have to fulfill your commitments 
once undertaken.
V. isLaM’s MOdELs Of CO-EXistEnCE and MOdErn-daY dEMOCratiC EqUaLitY
 Islamic history provides two different models of co-existence. I will talk about 
them in different situations. The first involves non-Muslims under the permanent 
protection of Muslims and the second involves Muslims under the protection of non-
Muslims.
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 The first, involving non-Muslims under the protection of Muslims, is Aqd 
al-Dhimma—the contract of protection. According to that contract, non-Muslims 
would be guaranteed the protection of the Islamic state to the same extent as Muslims 
would in exchange for these non-Muslims being bound to all the non-religious rules 
of Islamic law—meaning contract, torts, property, etc. Non-Muslims would obviously 
not be bound to Islamic rules of ritual. They would not be required to pray or fast, 
for example. They’re also exempt from certain kinds of criminal punishments because 
jurists viewed those to be essentially religious and not political in character. But they 
were bound to obey all the rules that were political or secular in character.
 The other circumstances involve Muslims under the protection of non-Muslims 
and this is again modeled along a treaty. And, assuming the terms of the treaty are 
valid, Muslims are bound to obey it. But Muslims cannot enter into a treaty that 
prohibits them from manifesting their religion. For example, if the terms of the 
treaty say that a person is allowed to stay somewhere as long as he does not pray or as 
long as he does not fast, that Muslim has no choice but to emigrate. Hence, if the 
non-Muslims are willing to tolerate Muslims only on the grounds that the Muslims 
do not practice their religion, then Muslims have a moral obligation to leave that 
country and go somewhere where they can practice their religion.
 Pre-modern Islamic law did not contemplate a model of equal citizenship. It had 
these models of co-existence, but it was not based on what we consider equal 
citizenship under today’s standards. Instead, there are two different models. One is a 
“Muslims in charge with non-Muslims obeying Islamic law” and the other is “non-
Muslims in charge with Muslims obeying non-Islamic law as long as Muslims have 
certain freedoms.” Democracy is a different model altogether because it is based on 
equal rights under law instead of communal autonomy.
 In the pre-modern world, Muslims insisted on communal autonomy just to 
practice their religious rituals and apply Islamic law internally. Under a democracy 
characterized by equality, this kind of communalism is in stark tension with that 
ideal. Democracy provides Muslim minorities with certain advantages relative to this 
sort of ancient regime of co-existence, but it also creates particular challenges.
 First, what are the advantages from the perspective of Muslim minorities? First, 
there is freedom of religion. Whereas in the pre-modern world, religious expression 
and the rights of Muslims were extremely constrained, in a democracy, there are 
much greater religious rights. In addition, there are also the general rights of citizens. 
So you do not just have the right to pray, you also have the right to vote, to run for 
office, to trade in the marketplace and so forth.
 On the other hand, a disadvantage is the loss of communal coercive power. In a 
democracy, Muslims do not have the right to apply Islamic law coercively on the 
members of the community, where they might have had that right in all sorts of pre-
modern regimes. Therefore, on the one hand it expands rights, but from another 
perspective it also reduces them.
 Therefore the fundamental question that modern Islamic political thought really 
needs to face is: Does democracy provide enough freedoms for Muslims to satisfy their 
fundamental religious obligations? The question is not whether democracies apply 
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Islamic law. I think this is a question that is debated quite intensely among modern 
Muslim thinkers. The answer hinges on whether democracy is satisfactory in that 
regard or whether there still needs to be more substantive protection for religion.
Vi. COnfLiCts bEtwEEn prinCipLEs Of CitizEnship and isLaMiC Law
 It is a trivial exercise to pick up a medieval treatise of Islamic law and point out 
substantive conflicts between the law set out in the medieval treatise and the modern 
standards of justice. However, we need to consider whether or not those rules really 
represent substantial modern-day conflicts or whether they are simply historical ones. 
 What are the sources of conflict? Substantive laws may differ regarding the scope 
of different freedoms. Islamic contract law for example, does not permit certain kinds 
of transactions that the common law does. Likewise, Islamic law permits polygamous 
marriages under certain conditions, whereas U.S. law does not. Likewise, Islamic 
inheritance mandates that an estate should be divided precisely among all legal heirs 
without any discretion given to the testator, whereas generally in U.S. law and other 
legal systems the testator has great freedom to dispose of his assets any way he 
wishes. Islamic law also forbids Muslims from waging wars with other Muslims, but 
citizenship in democratic countries may at times require Muslim citizens to bear 
arms against other believers. Not all of these are actual conflicts. Many cases simply 
involve the exercise of rights and can be solved by not exercising a particular right. 
For example, a Muslim could easily say that because he is living in the United States, 
he will not marry a second wife. That creates no conf lict because there is no 
obligation under Islamic law to marry a second wife; it is simply something that is 
permitted under certain circumstances. Likewise, a liberal state could choose not to 
criminalize polygamy and it could be resolved that way as well.
 Some Islamic laws, even if incompatible with modern conceptions of equality, such 
as the gender schemes of inheritance, seem perfectly compatible with general laws that 
give testators a wide freedom to dispose of their assets. Therefore there might be some 
Islamic rules that would be unconstitutional if adopted by the state, but are perfectly 
innocent when adhered to by individual citizens. This situation resolves many kinds of 
conflicts as well. Of course, there are some cases of actual conflict. Sometimes conflicts 
can be managed by exemptions from general law. For example, uniform requirements 
for policemen, or nurses, or public service conflict with the clothing requirements 
under Islam. Muslims may seek an exemption, or refrain from certain occupations 
requiring unsuitable uniforms. Sometimes, however, conflicts cannot be managed at 
all. As a purely hypothetical example (because it does not actually exist), if some sort of 
Muslim community were to insist on the right to criminalize apostasy, then of course 
many would say that cannot happen because that violates a core commitment of the 
United States—the constitutional commitment to freedom of religion. In that case, the 
Supremacy Clause would preclude an exception. In other instances, changing legal 
norms can eliminate or reduce conflict, such as in reformist interpretations of Islamic 
law or legal revolutions of public law. A specific example would be the Civil Rights 
Movement. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States reduced many of the 
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obstacles to Muslims living a good Islamic life in the United States. Islamic reform is 
not the subject of this paper, but one of the most sinister aspects of the anti-Sharia 
movement in the United States, besides distorting medieval Islamic law, is spreading 
the misinformation that doctrines of pre-modern Islamic law represent what Muslims 
in the twenty-first century believe today, which is not true.
 There are very complicated reasons as to why that is, but the important point is 
that most influential Islamic thinkers today accept democracy as a legitimate mode 
of collective governance, although they may have disagreements on specific areas and 
details regarding the relationship between religion and public law. Otherwise, the 
nature of the conflicts is eminently manageable within the domain of ordinary course 
accommodation for religious freedom as it has developed particularly in United 
States and Canada.
Vii. histOriCaL isLaMiC Law and bELiEfs Of COntEMpOrarY MUsLiMs
 Now I turn brief ly to historical Islamic law and the beliefs of contemporary 
Muslims. Why is it totally fallacious to pick up a medieval treatise of Islamic law and 
then cite rules from it as examples of what Muslims believe? Because it fails to 
recognize that in Islam there is a distinction between theology and legal doctrine. 
Whereas theological beliefs are immutable, legal rules are for the most part not 
immutable. Islamic law includes numerous techniques of reasoning that can be used 
to revise legal doctrines in light of changing circumstances. These techniques of 
legal interpretation have been particularly important in modernist doctrines of jihad 
that have radically revised pre-modern doctrines of armed conflict between Muslims 
and non-Muslims and for questions of gender, in which modernist Muslims have 
dramatically revised doctrines regarding gender so that modern Muslim conceptions 
are radically egalitarian as compared to pre-modern ones. These may not be as 
egalitarian as post-1960s United States or contemporary Canada, but they are almost 
ninety percent here.
 There are also reformist movements that go beyond traditional methods of legal 
interpretation and that scarcely pay heed to historical doctrines at all. A lot of modern 
Muslims just are plain ignorant of the pre-modern legal tradition, have no idea what 
it says, and would be shocked to know what it does say. This is because their moral 
intuitions have been thoroughly shaped by the post-World War II consensus about 
equality, including gender equality, and equality among peoples, etc. People who are 
not specialists in Islamic law have to be aware of this distinction between theological 
doctrines and legal doctrines, and from the perspective of Islamic believers, legal 
doctrines are not something that are set in stone, even though we believe that 
theological truths are immutable.
Viii. isLaMiC transnatiOnaLisM and U.s. fOrEign pOLiCY
 Finally, I want to touch on what I think has given rise to, or is the real cause of, 
the fear of Sharia. It has nothing to do with Muslims following Sharia because they 
are going to follow Sharia for things that have to do entirely with their private lives 
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such as their family and their business dealings. Unfortunately, I think this anti-
Sharia sentiment has to do with a political agenda that is very hostile to Muslims 
here because of Muslims’ transnationalism.
 Muslims believe in something called an umma—a spiritual body of all Muslims 
in the world. Naturally, this is something that goes beyond the borders of any one 
country. Muslims as part of their religious beliefs therefore have certain ties of 
solidarity with Muslims wherever they are. There is always this tension in a nation 
state between loyalties to the nation state and loyalty to or feelings of solidarity with 
people outside of the nation’s borders. This becomes particularly problematic given 
the role of the United States in the world today as the sole superpower and its 
penchant to intervene at will all over the world, but particularly in the Muslim world.
 This sense of transnational solidarity naturally gives rise to some tensions between 
Muslims living in the United States and abroad on the one hand and the United 
States with respect to the way it conducts its foreign policy on the other. Some of the 
issues of dispute are well-known. I think the great danger that we as a society face 
following 9/11 is that the space for legitimate public criticism of U.S. policy has 
constricted radically. Prior to 9/11, I think Muslims in the United States felt generally 
free to criticize the United States publicly without any fear of retribution; however, I 
think that freedom is gone completely. The great risk is that by radically constricting 
the space for legitimate dissent from government policies, the United States is 
alienating future generations of Muslim Americans and exacerbating conflict between 
Islam and public law rather than reducing it or at least containing it.
 So now what we have are Muslim organizations who scarcely utter any word of 
condemnation or criticism of any U.S. policy. The reason why I think this is 
dangerous is because of what I stated earlier: Muslim relations with non-Muslims are 
fine as long as they do not lead to some kind of sense of humiliation and inferiority. 
And in a democratic society there is no greater humiliation than being treated 
differently by your government. An unhealthy conflict is not inevitable, but could 
very well be the result of particular policy decisions. Instead of adopting ever greater 
security measures designed to monitor Muslims’ behaviour ever more closely, the 
United States could have responded, and could yet still respond, in the manner of 
Norway, whose prime minister stated that the Norwegian government’s response to 
its 9/11 would be more democracy, not less.4
 So I fear that in a democratic society where you have government-tolerated, and 
in some cases government-sponsored, discrimination, you are going to generate 
backlash among Muslim citizens who grew up here. There has actually been data 
that suggest that children of immigrants in democracies—whether the United States, 
Britain, or France—are much more alienated than their parents.5 I think the reason 
4. See An Attack on the Norwegian Democracy, Norway—The Permanent Delegation to the OSCE, 
http://www.norway-osce.org/Latest-news/An-Attack-on-the-Norwegian-Democracy (last updated 
Aug. 8, 2011).
5. Pew Research Ctr. for the People and the Press, Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in 
Alienation or Support for Extremism (2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/
muslim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-in-alienation-or-support-for-extremism/?src=prc-headline.
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is because they have imbibed democratic values, but then find disconnects between 
those values that they believe should exist and their experience. That creates a very 
dangerous situation. And I hope that that’s what we focus on, and not the teachings 
of medieval Islamic law.

